Nigeria Government: Boko Haram and the failure of intelligence

In the early hours of December 2, 2013, the Islamic terrorist sect, Boko Haram, let loose violence and death on Maiduguri — and especially on  army bases where, according to the Ministry of Defence spokesman, Brig. Chris Olukolade,  “helicopters and decommissioned military aircraft were incapacitated.” There are no accurate account of losses, deaths and destruction. However, what seems clear is that Boko Haram now appears unstoppable.

This latest round of havoc happened against two backdrops. First, a state of emergency has been in place in Maiduguri since May and yet the group has been able to operate at will. Second, in mid-September, Mr. Ekpenyong Ita, the Director-General of the State Security Service, bragged: “We have decimated the terrorists’ top and middle level leadership and its foot soldiers thereby dislodging its centre of gravity…the group, for now does not possess the capacity to direct and launch simultaneous attacks.” The SSS D

G either spoke too early, misspoke or he was just being political.

Clearly, Boko Haram is getting deadlier and more audacious. It seems to think it has the wherewithal to roam whatever space it wanted. The sect also seems to believe that government is incapable of putting a stop to its mission. Frankly, its leadership may be right. After all, it has basically done and undone even in the face of threats, arrests, imprisonments, bombings and deaths. The group was so bold it laughed at and then rejected amnesty and peace entreaties from government and other entities.

There are three essentials you need to know regarding Boko Haram. First, it has a better understanding of the Nigerian government than the government does of it. It knows, for instance, that this administration does not have the courage to wage an all-out offensive. Second, the group has allies and supporters in and outside of government and the intelligence community that enable her one or two steps ahead of the government. Third, in addition to domestic funding, it seems to have backers outside of the Nigerian borders.

And of course there are three things you need to know about terrorism. Once it germinates, it is difficult to uproot it. Second, unless those factors that give rise to and enable it are addressed, counter-measures could be very ineffective.  In earlier articles I discussed some of the factors that gave rise to terrorism in Nigeria, i.e. a personalized and barbaric political space; not having a sense of belonging; and the lack of basic human needs. What’s more, if the penalty for crimes and terrorism are not high, then, you embolden others. Such an environment becomes a fertile ground for scoundrels and violent non-state actors.

What’s to be done about Boko Haram? Well, as a stop-gap measure, government must be willing to employ some of the tactics the US Government uses in fighting the Mafia and terrorist groups. I also think that religious and traditional rulers in the northern part of the country should consider Boko Haram a danger to their sphere of influence and power.  Should the violence escalate, the political and economic landscape of northern Nigeria will be gravely altered. And should it spread to the South, then, the equivalent retaliations likely to follow will alter the nation’s alignment. We must not forget that domestic events have a way of impacting international concerns. Therefore, an out-of-control Boko Haram will severely impact the West and Central African sub-regions.

For several years now, Nigeria has become a country where many do not care about legal sanctions. We got to this point because of weak governing institutions, terrible leadership and a national culture that rewards theft, waste and excesses. We lost the war against corruption, and also lost the war against indiscipline. And then there is this deep sense of alienation and indifference. The combined effects of these deficits are what you see today: the constant beating down of and exploitation of the country by citizens and non-citizens.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta almost brought the Yar’Adua government to its knees before a truce was called and amnesty offered.

We now have a rag-tag army the Jonathan government cannot protect itself or its citizens against. Heck, it can’t even protect its military and security installations. A government that cannot protect itself against domestic and foreign enemies is not worthy of anything! I will not be surprised – and no one should be surprised – if in the next couple of weeks or months Boko Haram takes a shot at Aso Rock or its Presidential Air Fleet or motorcade. What would be the “tipping point” before this government and its various security and intelligence units wake up?

Now, what we have here and have had for a very long time is a failure of intelligence. For far too long, this community has not been able to effectively monitor a series of problems inundating the country and these includes money laundering, oil bunkering, drug trafficking, gang activities, political corruption, the violation of the country’s borders and airspace and other transnational activities.  Foreign intelligence agencies also operate at will. In general, the intelligence community has been reactive, instead of being proactive. More often than not, it has been loud and brash and impotent in carrying out its mandate.

And especially in the case of Boko Haram, the intelligence community has been nothing but a monumental failure. In spite of 5,000 deaths, several hundred injuries and several millions of dollars in lost and damaged properties, it has not been able to put a stop to the group’s reign. Is it that Boko Haram cannot be infiltrated? Its foot soldiers and leaders cannot be tailed? And that listening devices do not function properly? Or, is this all politics?

However, in spite of my criticisms, let me clear:  There is no perfect intelligence community anywhere in the world as they are all susceptible to lapses and failures – failures and lapses that might arise from human and technical errors in the gathering, analyses and or operational phases. Also, the internal dynamics of a country or of the administration may hamper the efficacy of the community. And finally, inadequate funding, poor training, immolating cultures and tendencies of the organisation may be a burden.

It is time the National Intelligence Agency, the Department of State Security generally referred to as State Security Service, and the Defence Intelligence Agency, lived up to their commitment. What support do they need that they are not getting?