Concluding part..........
Counterterrorism was another source of attractiveness to the region. Supplying Afghanistan with troops and supplies meant the US and its allies needed the Central Asians. Now the footprint is much less. Counterterrorism is done on the cheap with drones-and in Pakistan and Afghanistan we don't even need permission. Our exit is an opportunity for China's Eurasian gambit.
Global Consequences
Beyond their Eurasian symmetry, there are a host of common interests, both in opposition to US primacy, US and Japanese values of democracy and transparency and a shared desire for a more multipolar world order. Both are pursuing nationalist agendas, drawing on historic, cultural identities, Confucianism and Russian Orthodox traditions, respectively. Both seek an authoritarian capitalist model in opposition to the "Washington Consensus." Both oppose an open internet and seek to Balkanize it.
This raises profound questions about the future of global governance and the dynamics of world order. In the worst case scenario, a new bipolarity could emerge, with China, Russia and a handful of authoritarian regime from Central Asia on one pole and the US, EU, Japan and Asian allies and partners on the other. This is not a recipe for peace and prosperity. It would leave many of what were once known as "non-aligned" nations like India, Brazil, Egypt and others caught in between.
Sino-Russian Contradictions
Yet there are also trends in other directions. While Russia has sought to pull back from the global economy it entered upon the collapse of the USSR in 1991, China has bet its future on the global economy and has a domestic agenda of market reforms aimed at transforming its investment-driven export-oriented economy into a consumer-led innovative economy. Then there is China's economic calculus: China trade with the US, Japan and EU totalled $1.4 trillion in 2014 compared to $100 billion in Sino-Russian trade.
While the Russian petro-state appears in slow, but steady decline, China is a rising state, increasingly defining itself as a Great Power, and one seeming intent on fostering a contemporary version of pre-modern Sino-centric tributary rule in Asia.
China is also uncomfortable with Russian intervention in former Soviet republics where breakaway movements have been encouraged, as in Eastern Ukraine. Beijing is obsessed with sovereignty issues. It has not been an enthusiastic supporter of Russian moves in Ukraine.
With slower growth in China reducing its energy demand and lower oil prices, China's attraction to Russia as an energy provider is diminishing. Already, there are reports that China is backing away from a deal to build a second pipeline from Siberia.
And, Russia is ill at ease with the Asianification of the Russian Far East, with 100 million Chinese across the Amur River border and only 7 million Russians in the Far East. This has racial overtones as well. Moreover, much of China's territorial assertiveness in the East and South China Seas has been based on historical claims. China's Ming dynasty claimed much of the Russian Far East, before Moscow occupied it in the 17th century.
Russia can only hope that the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas pitting US, Japan and Asian allies against China will escalate, throwing Beijing into Moscow's arms. Beijing will see how much the US respects China's maritime interests.
Do these trends mean that Sino-Russian amiability may not be as durable as some argue? Will historic fears and competition reassert itself? Is there an opportunity for the US to recreate something closer to the Kissingerian strategic triangle?
Ball in US Court
Whether the world moves towards this new, troublesome bipolarity or moves in the direction of a more inclusive, still globalizing international order will depend in no small degree to what role the US plays in a complex landscape where power is diffused and no single nation can singularly shape international outcomes.
It will require more US and Japanese agility and pragmatic realism, abandoning unipolar tendencies and the US acting more as first among equals. All the presidential campaigns are likely to outdo themselves in their rhetoric against both Russia and China, missing the opportunity to talk about how the US will need to come to terms with a changing world order and a new distribution of power. Both the media's and US political campaigns' inclination to focus on small stuff is blinding us to the big strategic shifts. Yes, there's a new Great Game afoot, but we're being seriously outplayed.
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